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I. INTRODUCTION
An important goal of international trade organizations like the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") is to remove trade barriers among frontiers in order to
secure free and fair opportunities for member countries. However, unfair and
anti-competitive practices by private firms in the domestic markets can create
further barriers to overcome, in addition to those trade barriers at the frontiers. As
the major frontier barriers to international trade among the member countries
have been reduced through multilateral negotiations under the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO system, there has been an
increasing world-wide interest in other types of anti-competitive practices. With
regards to these practices, Korea and Japan have traditionally been the target of
criticism from their trade partner countries. This is because they have
manipulated anti-competitive practices to protect their domestic markets, and
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their regulation of restrictive competitive practices have been loosened compared
to their respective trade volumes.'
This paper is a comparative study of the anti-competitive practices used by
Korea and Japan, analyzing their competition policies on the trade policies,
considering the growing interest in anti-competitive practices and the criticism of
the two countries. In this study, the term "anti-competitive practices" includes
private restrictive business practices and their governmental regulations, which
consequently hamper the flow of trade and competition and have been regarded
as trade barriers.
This comparative study examines the difference in regulating the anti-
competitive practices of Korea and Japan, and suggests some direction for the
harmonization and establishment of common rules to regulate the practices of the
two countries. This analysis will also imply the possibility of cooperation
between the two countries at plurilateral or multilateral trade negotiations, and
the possibility of establishing the legal environment in the field of trade and
competition policy for a free trade area between the two countries in the near
future.
II. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN DOMESTIC MARKETS
A. International Regulation
1. Anti-Competitive Practices as Trade Barriers
Many attempts have been made bilaterally, plurilaterally, and multilaterally to
regulate and eliminate unfair and anti-competitive practices, that act as trade barriers.
For the purposes of this discussion, "trade barrier" means any kind of entry barrier to
an importing countries' domestic market which impedes the complete national
treatment. One approach to eliminate trade barriers is to harmonize the conflicts
between the trade policies and the competition policies, both which have recently
received interest worldwide.2
Entry barriers to the importing countries' domestic market is the focus of
competition policy which is under the control of domestic competition authorities.
However, it can also be understood as a matter of trade policy, from the viewpoint of
1. See Frederick M. Abbott, Prevention and Settlement of Economic Disputes between Japan and the
United States, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 185, 189-90 (1999). For example, Japanese and Korean policies
and practices related to market access have usually been discussed in the annual National Trade Estimate Report
on Foreign Trade Barriers ("NTE"). This report is prepared by the United States Trade Representative
[hereinafter USTR] to identify policies and practices of U.S. trading partners that the USTR considers
inconsistent with a legal obligation or otherwise unfair to U.S. industry.
2. See Terence P. Stewart, U.S.-JAPAN Economic Disputes: The Role of Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Laws, 16 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 689, 736-39 (1999). Over the last half-century, the members of the GATT/
WTO have accomplished much in the way of trade liberalization, however, they have not changed the relationship
between trade laws and competition laws in a global economy.
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the exporting countries' trade authorities. In principle, the basic purpose of trade
policies and competition policies is the same: the improvement of economic
efficiency and the consumer's welfare-level.3 Thus the two policies share common
objectives through non-discriminatory, transparent, rules-based regimes.
Unfortunately, in the course of enforcing the two policies, conflicts can occur
when policies with conflicting priorities are imposed.
4 Traditional discussions have
focused on evaluating the effect of trade policy on domestic competition policy.
More recently, as the trade barriers among major countries have been substantially
removed, international trade institutes, such as WTO and Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), have concentrated on the effects of
domestic competition policy on trade policy
The main purpose of international discussions on the effects of competition
policy on international trade6 is to reduce the disparity between individual
countries' markets, and to secure a fair and free domestic market structure for
access to the domestic market under the precondition that the trade barriers
between the frontiers should be eliminated completely. In the absence of an
effective competition law to regulate private anti-competitive practices
8 in the
domestic markets, the gains from liberalized trade may be undermined, or
conversely, the absence of trade and investment liberalization will defer or
prevents access to pro-competitive foreign goods.
It is unrealistic to treat international trade policies and competition policies
separately, as there are many examples of how these two policies overlap.
9 Thus,
3. Kevin C. Kennedy, Foreign Direct Investment and Competition Policy at World Trade Organization,
33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 585 (2001).
4. See William H. Barringer, Competition Policy and Cross Border Dispute Resolution: Lessons
Learned from the U.S.-JAPAN Film Dispute, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 459, 462 (1998) (demonstrating the
different objectives of the trade laws and the competition laws in the United States). For example, "antitrust
laws are intended to protect competition and, thereby, consumers.. trade laws are intended to protect and
enhance the positions of the U.S. competitors whether in the U.S. market or in foreign markets." Id.
5. Michael K. Young, Lessons from the Battle Fronts: U.S.-Japan Trade Wars and Their Impact on the
Multilateral Trading System, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 753,755-56 (2001).
6. See Barringer, supra note 4, at 477 (explaining that, "at present, it is difficult to ascertain whether in
fact restrictive business practices have to any significant extent replaced formal barriers to trade as impediments
to market access"). Indeed, there is no mechanism for even beginning to explore this question much less
resolving the problem if such practices actually have a significant impact on trade. Id.
7. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 586 (noting that "in connection with an agreement on competition
policy, the argument runes that harmonization of national antitrust laws would have at least three salutary
benefits. First, a WTO competition policy agreement that harmonized national laws would provide a more
predictable legal environment within which multinational firms could operate. Second, WTO-national
enforcement authorities. Third, harmonization under WTO auspices would avoid conflicting jurisdictional
disputes and potential conflicting decisions by national enforcei.-:.n authorities.").
8. Id. at 587 ("the best method for removing these private barriers to market access, some argue, is
through aggressive enforcement of competition laws. Consequently, competition law directed at private conduct
is a natural complement to a set of international rules regulating government barriers to market access").
9. JOINT GROUP ON TRADE AND COMPETITION, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, COMPLEMENTARITIES BETWEEN TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES (1999), available at http://www.
olis.oecd.org/olis/1998doc.nsfflinkto/com-td-daffe-clp(98)9
8 -fmal (hereinafter OECD).
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anti-competitive practices have been highlighted as one kind of trade barrier
which could, if not regulated appropriately, interrupt access to the domestic
market of imported goods for foreign exporters."
2. International Efforts to Regulate Anti-competitive Practices
Since the 1948 attempts to establish international rules to regulate restrictive
business practices" with the Havana Charter for the International Trade
Organization" failed, efforts have been made in vain to create an international
consensus on the regulation of anti-competitive business practices." Hereafter,
discussions will focus on how international trade-related institutes have
attempted to harmonize individual countries' competition policies, in an attempt
to establish common regulatory rules.
The first attempt, was the International Trade Organization's ("ITO") plan to
regulate restrictive business practices. 4 The ITO regulations would have forced
members to prevent business practices from hampering international trade that
restrained competition, limited access to markets or fostered monopolistic
control, or were harmful to the expansion of production or trade. 5 The ITO
charter would have provided a provision for consultation procedures in cases
where member countries permitted a restrictive business practice, and also would
have stipulated procedures for the ITO to investigate complaints raised.16
10. See Barringer, supra note 4, at 459-60. The most visible and well documented instance of a cross
border dispute regarding alleged restrictive business practices affecting trade would be the film dispute between
the U.S. and Japan; Section 304 Determinations: Barriers to Access to the Japanese Market for Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper, 61 Fed. Reg. 30, 929 (June 18, 1996).
11. See Mitsuo Matsushita, Essay, United States-Japan Trade Issues and a Possible Bilateral Antitrust
Agreement Between the United States and Japan, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 249, 250 (1999) (arguing that
"multinational enterprises could operate in 'the twilight zone' or 'no man's land' without being affected by
national competition laws."). In such situations, "extraterritorial application of national competition laws is
often ineffective and creates conflicts among nations." Id. That is part of the background for international
cooperation in the competition policy being called for among the national authorities. Id.
12. See JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RLEATIONS (3d ed. 1995).
13. Barringer, supra note 4, at 460 (explaining that "the alleged facts and related business practices at
issue in the film dispute [between the United States and Japan] and the underlying disagreements as to the
competitive effects of practices alleged, raise serious doubts about the ability of the world trading community to
harmonize competition policy rules.").
14. See JACKSON, supra note 12, at 1092.
15. Id. at 1092 (citing ITO Charter, art. 46(1), the kinds of practices that would have been subject to ITO
investigation were "fixing prices, terms or conditions... ; excluding enterprises from, or allocating or dividing,
any territorial market ... or allocating customers, or fixing sales quotas... ; discriminating against particular
enterprises; limiting production or fixing production quotas; preventing by agreement the development or
application of technology or invention ... ; and extending the use of intellectual property rights to matters
which are not within the scope of such grants, .... ).
16. Id. (citing ITO Charter, arts. 47-48).
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Even though the ITO provisions were not written into the General Agreement,'
7
efforts to establish an agreement on restrictive business practices have continuously
appeared.'" However, it was concluded that it would have been unrealistic to draw up
a multilateral agreement to control international restrictive business practices, except
for consultations to attempt to resolve allegations of restrictive business practices
affecting trade.' 9 Since the implementation of the WTO mechanism,
° renewed
interest has arisen in this matter2' and has forced the WTO to address the
relationship between trade and competition 
policy.22
Second, there have been OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises. The
23
OECD guidelines were intended to be recommendations to multinational
enterprises operating in member countries' territories, the observance of which
17. However, there are those that view some GATT provisions as bearing directly or indirectly, on
business practices. See, e.g., JOINT GROUP ON TRADE AND COMPETITION, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION ELEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: 
A POST-
URUGUAY ROUND OVERVIEW OF WTO AGREEMENTS (1991) available at http://www.olis.oecd.
org/olis/1998doc.nsf/linkto/com-td-daffe-clp(98)
2 6 -final; see also, JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE
SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 240 (2000).
18. There have been discussions about a WTO Agreement on Competition designed to deal with market
access problems caused by anti-competitive practices. So far, it has been suggested that a WTO Agreement on
Competition could be limited to a Ministerial Declaration to facilitate the application of Article XXIII: l(b)
"Private anticompetitive practices can nullify and impair concession. The failure of a member to apply its
national competition law to a private anticompetitive practice that has the effect of nullifying or impairing a
concession is a valid basis for complaint under Article XXIII: l(b). Such a failure will be construed as an
'application' of a measure, as called for by Article XXIII: l(b)." Hindly, Competition Law and the WTO:
Alternative Structures for Agreement in Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisite for Free Trade, cited by
JEAN-FRAN4OIS BELLIS, ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES AND THE WTO: THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR NEW
WORLD TRADE RULES, NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 365-66 (2000).
19. The Decision of the Contracting Parties on Restrictive Business Practices, 1960 O.J. (L1015). That
was the only effort of the GATT to address cartels and their effect on trade prior to the establishment of the
working group in 1996 to deal with trade and competition policy. Barringer, supra note 4, at 463, n.22; see also
James D. Southwick, Addressing Market Access Barriers in Japan through the WTO: A Survey of Typical
Japan Market Access Issues and the Possibility to Address them through WTO Dispute Resolution Procedures,
31 LAW AND POL'Y INT'L BUS. 923,964 (2000).
20. Abbott, supra note 1, at 185 (noting that even though the WTO mechanism moves the GATT system
from a soft law to a hard law, there are important gaps in the WTO rule system.) One of the gaps is the
"absence of minimum rules on the maintenance of competitive domestic markets." Id. (emphasis added).
21. BELLIS, supra note 18, at 361.
22. See SINGAPORE WTO MINISTERIAL 1996: MINISTERIAL DECLARATION (1996), available at
http://www. wto.org/english/thewto -e/minist e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2003) (noting that
the 1996 ministerial conference in Singapore agreed to establish a working group to study issues relating to the
interaction between trade and competition policy). The Doha Declaration in 2001, instructed working group to
focus on clarifying core principles including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and
provision on "hardcore" cartels (i.e. cartels that are formally set-up); ways of handling voluntary cooperation on
competition policy among WTO member governments; support for progressive reinforcement of competition
institution in developing countries through capacity building. WTO DOHA DECLARATION, available at
http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop--e/ddaSe/dohaexplained-e.htm.
23. OECD, International Investment and Multinational Enterprises [rev. ed. (1979)], as amended,
OECD, International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: The 1984 Review of the 1976 Declaration and
Decisions, 9 (1984), cited by JACKSON, ET AL., supra note 12, at 1094.
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was voluntary and not legally binding.24 Since the guidelines were suggested in
1976, several attempts to establish international rules to regulate the anti-
competitive practices have been made, yet have not been realized. 25 However,
OECD member countries have recently become interested in the international
regulation of these practices.26
Third, there were efforts by the United Nations to regulate restrictive business
practices.
UNCTAD extended initial consideration to the matter of restrictive business
practices in the 1970s. In 1980, the United Nations Conference on Restrictive
Business Practices adopted a code of conduct,27 which is generally accepted as
being the most detailed international agreement on the issue. According to this
code, independent enterprises should refrain from certain practices which limit
market access or otherwise unduly restrain competition28 and refrain from
abusing their dominant economic position through certain practices.29 However,
the code does not seem to have as much of an effect as the other attempts made
by the United Nations to regulate business behavior. °
Fourth, a draft of a international antitrust code was put forward.3' A group
composed mainly of antitrust experts, and scholars from Germany, the United
States, Japan, Switzerland and Poland proposed the Draft International Antitrust
Code32 in 1993. The Draft Code ("Code") required a minimum standard for
24. According to the 1976 OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises regarding competition
practices, enterprises should do as follows: "i) refrain from abusing a dominant position; ii) should not restrict
purchasers, ... to resell; iii) refrain from participating in... strengthening the restrictive effects ... cartels or
restrictive agreements which are competition-restrictive; and iv) be ready to consult and co-operate with
competent authorities of countries concerned." Id.
25. There has continuously been a series of Council Recommendations, Committee Reports and
Working Party reports addressing issues of competition policy as it affects trade since 1976. Those series are
available at http://www.oecd.org/home/ (last visited May 15, 2003).
26. See OECD, supra note 9.
27. Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules U.N.Doc.TD/RBP/10(1980) [hereinafter
Principles and Rules], reprinted in JACKSON, ET AL. supra note 12, at 1095.
28. Id. at 1095-96. Such practices included: "i) agreements fixing prices... ; ii) collusive tendering; iii)
market or customer allocation arrangements; iv) allocation. . . to sales and production; v) collective action to
enforce arrangements. . . ; vi) concerted refusal of supplies to potential importers; and vii) collective denial of
access to an arrangement or association .... Id.
29. id. at 1096. Such acts included: "i) predatory behavior towards competitors... ; ii) discriminatory
pricing or terms or conditions .. . ; iii) mergers, takeovers, joint ventures ... ; iv) fixing the prices at which
goods exported can be resold in importing countries; v) restrictions on the importation... ; and vi) when not for
ensuring the achievement of legitimate business purpose ... : (a) partial or complete refusals to deal . . . ; (b)
making the supply.., dependent upon the acceptance of restrictions on the distribution or manufacture of
competing or other goods; (c) imposing restrictions ... ; (d) making the supply... dependent upon the
purchase of other goods or services from the supplier or his designee." Id.
30. See id. at 1097.
31. Matsushita, supra note 11, at 249, 250-51. This draft was different from the above three attempts in
character from the viewpoint that the draft was not the multilateral type but the plurilateral one. This is not as
comprehensive as a multilateral arrangement currently, however, plurilateral arrangement might be more
feasible than a multilateral agreement in the competition law area.
32. See JACKSON, ET AL., supra note 12, at 1097 (citing the "Draft International Antitrust Code as a
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national antitrust laws.33 The Code divided 'business restraints' into two groups:
horizontal and vertical.34 It also included provisions for the control of abuse of a
dominant position which adversely affects competition in any market.3" The
International Antitrust Authority was to be established to implement the Code."
An International Antitrust Panel was also to be created and to be operated like the
GATT dispute settlement panel.37 The Code appears to be too specific, however,
if it is developed into international rules to regulate the anti-competitive
practices, it will be more effective than past proposals.
While those multilateral or plurilateral attempts have failed,39 the problem of
the anti-competitive practices have increased in recent years.4° There has also
been general consensus that the interface between trade and competition policies
GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement" and accompanying commentary were reprinted in BNA Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Reb., vol. 65, no. 1628 [hereinafter "BNA"] (August 19, 1993)); see Emst-Ulrich Petersmann,
International Competition Rules for the GATT-MTO World Trade and Legal System, J. WORLD TRADE 35 (Dec.
1993).
33. See BNA, supra note 32. The Draft stipulated four principles: "i) establishment of national laws to
solve international competition problems; ii) national treatment; iii) establishment of minimum standards for
antitrust rules and; iv) establishment of an international authority to settle disputes over antitrust issues." Id.
34. JACKSON, ET AL. supra note 12, at 1097-98 (regarding the shapes of the horizontal and vertical
restrictions).
35. See id. at 1099. These include: limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers, applying dissimilar conditions which place other trading parties at a competitive
disadvantage and making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance of supplementary obligations. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1099.
38. Matsushita, supra note 11, at 251. Besides the above multilateral and plurilateral attempts, there
have been bilateral attempts to regulate anti-competitive practices. There are a number of bilateral agreements
on competition policy, which, currently, may be only possible form of agreement. Id. Work by the OECD's
Joint Group on Trade and Competition has identified five international options to improve the coherence
between trade and competition policies: "enhanced voluntary convergence; enhanced bilateral co-operation
between competition authorities; regional agreements containing competition policy provision; plurilateral
competition policy agreements; and multilateral competition policy agreement." OECD, Joint Group on Trade
and Competition: International Options to Improve the Coherence between Trade and Competition Policies, at
2 (Feb. 9, 2000), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1999doc.nsf/linkto/com-td-daffe-clp(99)102-final
(last visited October 13, 2003).
39. SOUTHWICK, supra note 19, at 963-64. (according to the record to date on reaching agreements
restricting anti-competitive practices and market structures, for example, in Japan, using GATI/WTO
mechanisms has been generally unsuccessful. The EC raised in 1983 a complaint under Article XXIII: l(c) of
the GATT alleging that the "difficulty of penetrating the Japanese market" resulted from keiretsu structures, lost
distribution systems, restrictive regulations for the introduction of new products or prices, and "less visible
barriers, but failed." ).
40. See SINGAPORE WTO MINISTERIAL 1996, supra note 22. At least three WTO agreements speak
directly to the issue of restrictive business practices: "i) Article 9 of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures ("TRIMs Agreement") directs.., to consider whether the TRIMs Agreement should be
complemented with provisions on investment and competition policy...; ii) Articles 8, 31 and 40 of the
Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement") address issues
of anticompetitive practices ... ; iii) Articles VIII and IX of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS") prohibit monopoly service suppliers from discriminating ... and obligate WTO members to enter
into consultations ... on restrictive business practices of service suppliers." KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 602-
603.
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is more important, due to the ongoing process of economic globalization.4
Besides the international attempts to treat with this matter,42 many developed
countries have regulated various kinds of anti-competitive practices through the
expansion and application of the concept of "fair trade" provided in international
or individual domestic trade laws, along with the extraterritorial application of
their domestic competition laws.43 For example, according to Section 301(d) of
the United States' Trade Act of 1974," a government's toleration of systematic
anti-competitive activities by/among private firms that have the effect of
restricting access of the imported goods to the domestic market may be regarded
as "unreasonable." 5 The concept of reasonable or fair trade practice, which
exceeds the scope of the tariff or non-tariff barriers at the frontiers has become
the widely and strictly accepted basis of securing fair competition in the domestic
market for foreign companies. 6
B. Korea
Anti-competitive practices in Korea are discussed from the viewpoints of
competition policy, transparency and anti-import bias. During the dynamic
period of economic growth and development from the 1960s to the 1990s, the
Korean government traditionally promoted economic development much more
41. OECD, JOINT GROUP ON TRADE AND COMPETITION, supra note 38. Besides the economic
globalization, this consensus was triggered by other factors, such as trends toward regional integration, the
rebirth of capitalism in Eastern Europe, the Latin American economic reforms, the creation of WTO, the new
legal instruments for dealing with regulatory reform in open economics, and the growing number of competition
cases involving more than one country. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 587
42. Trade disputes on the anti-competitive practices might in theory be resolved under a non-violation
nullification or impairment action in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, however, the lack of clarity
of the WTO System in applying the non-violation rules makes such solutions problematic on all sides. Abbott,
supra note 1, at 185.
43. See JACKSON, ET AL., supra note 12, at 1078-89 (cases relating to extraterritorial enforcement of the
U.S. Antitrust Laws).
44. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (d). Section 301 gives the United States President a broad authority to take all
appropriate steps within his power to obtain the elimination of a transgression, if he determines that a foreign
country has committed any one of several transgressions: "i) maintaining unjustifiable or unreasonable trade
barriers...; ii) imposing discriminatory or other unjustifiable or unreasonable burdens or restrictions...; iii)
granting export subsidies...; iv) imposing unjustifiable or unreasonable restrictions.." Alan C. Swan, Prevention
and Settlement of Economic Disputes between Japan and the United States, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 37, 48
(1990). ("the aggressive resent-oriented approach under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 was evaluated to
be in sharp contrast to the cautious approach of cooperation, consensus building and the development of
procedural mechanisms to address cross border competition issues advocated by the official U.S. policy.")
Barringer, supra note 4, at 460.
45. RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 536 (1996).
46. Possible options for solving cases involving such anti-competitive practices, for example, in the
United States are: "i) proceed under Section 301; ii) bring an anti-trust action in a United States court; iii) seek
dispute resolution procedures under WTO; or iv) urge "positive comity" on the foreign enforcement
agencies... to fully enforce their competition cases.. " Peter E. Ehrenhaft, Asil Holdo Corporate Counsel
Committee Briefing on International Antitrust and U.S.-Japan Relations (The American Society of International
Law Newsletter), Sept. 1995.
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directly and positively than any other Asian country. 47 This resulted in a greater
disparity between which resulted in a greater disparity in income growth, prices,
trade, and structural change. During this time, the government made major
decisions with regards to the management of the Korean economy,48 and the
condensed growth initiated by the government was achieved at the cost of
retarding development of a national competition policy.
Since the financial crisis in 1997, 49 which could be interpreted as being the
critical turning point in Korean competition policy, Korea has taken positive
steps to create a more open, market-oriented economy50 by breaking unproductive
relations between the government, banks, and chaebol (conglomerates). Such
relationships had been assessed as impeding competition and market access in
Korea and resulting in excessive financial difficulties, over-capacity and
uneconomic investments.' However, the Korean government's extensive
involvement in the private sector during the process of corporate restructuring in
the financial sector has sometimes been evaluated as creating additional
52impediments in progress towards a more market-based economy.
Despite the revision of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law53 to
enhance and broaden the Korea Fair Trade Commission' s
54 ("KFTC") authority,5
Korea's enforcement of competition policy and the KFTC have generally been
considered weak, compared with other policies and agencies in the Korean
47. See CHO SOON, THE DYNAMICS OF KOREAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 27-59 (1994) (giving a
detailed analysis of Korean economic development from the 1960s to the 1990s).
48. See id. at 178-81 (discussing the roles of the government in Korean economic development).
49. David Richardson, Asian Financial Crisis (Economics, Commerce and Industrial Relations Group)
June 29, 1998, available at http://www.aph.gov.au. (last visited Oct. 13, 2003). For the IMF funding of USD 21
billion to meet the financial problems in 1997, Korean government promised to take the package of measures to
IMF: tight monetary policy with high interest rates to stabilize markets; tight fiscal policy; strengthening the
financial system through a firm exit policy, market and supervisory discipline and increased competition;
further trade liberalization; easing restrictions on foreign ownership; making it easier to dismiss workers. Id.
50. See WTO, Trade Policy Review-Korea: 2000 at 9 (2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/tpre/tpl38_e.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2003) [hereinafter WTO: Korea]. Notwithstanding the
seriousness of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the severity of the recession that followed, the Korean
government has failed, by small and large, to resist protectionist pressures, opting instead for far-reaching
market-based reforms. These reforms have been assessed to help pave the way not only for the remarkable
recovery of the economy from the crisis, but for strong sustainable growth in the future.
51. Richardson, supra note 49. Korea's financial problem in 1997 has been indicated as emerging as a
number of highly leveraged chaebols become bankrupt as a result of over-investment in steel and cars, and
weakened profitability with the cyclical downturn. The bankruptcies weakened the financial system with non-
performing loans reaching 7.5 percent of GDP. The decline in stock prices further reduced the value of bank
equity. All of these led to a sharp fall in external finance.
52. See WTO: Korea, supra note 50, at 9. "In the aftermath of the crisis in 1997, financial services have
undergone far-reaching reforms aimed at increasing competition and rehabilitating the financial system . . .
Rescue operations have reduced the number of banks but temporarily increased state involvement in these
institutions."
53. Law No. 6651 (2002), available at http://lawquiz.hihome.comlaw-Korean version.
54. The KFrC has been playing an increasingly active role both in enforcement of Korea's competition
law and in advocating for regulatory reform and corporate restructuring. USTR, NTE (KOREA) 256 (2003)
available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2003/korea.pdf.
55. See Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law (2002) (specifically noting art. 36).
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government." As a prerequisite for competition policy, the KFTC has to be
established as an independent organization with proper authority, and must also
apply the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law more evenly among
domestic and foreign businesses.
Although Korea has made progress on transparency issues,57 the Korean
government has been criticized for lacking transparency in rulemaking
procedures and maintaining a regulatory system." Korean trade-related laws and
regulations have also been criticized for lacking specificity. 9 This system gives
government officials room to exercise wide discretion in applying those laws and
regulations, which results in inconsistency in their application and uncertainty in
doing business.6° Internal office guidance developed by relevant government
agencies, but rarely published, gives direction in the implementation of
regulations. Although, information about planned or actual changes to laws and
regulations are not adequately available.
Frugality campaigns in Korea, ostensibly directed at limiting individual
consumption, and has traditionally been regarded as serving to discourage
imports.6' While the Korean government is no longer directly involved in anti-
import campaigns,62 and has taken various steps63 to discourage overt anti-import
activity, social pressure along with the negative public image of imported
consumer goods have impeded imports into Korea.64 Korea's past legacy of being
56. Id.
57. See WTO: Korea, supra note 50, at 2. Since the financial crisis in 1997, Korean government has
made efforts to improve transparency in trade and investment policies by meeting regular GATT/WTO
notification requirements as well as by simplifying and translating the regulatory framework into English as
well as making parts of it available through a web-based computer network.
58. See USTR, NTE (KOREA), supra note 54, at 257. (criticizing Korean government for lacking
transparency).
59. See Eun Sup Lee, Safeguard Mechanism in Korea Under the WTO World, 14 TRANSNAT'L LAW 323
355 (2001).
60. For example, imported food products in particular have been claimed to remain susceptible to
capricious interpretation of ambiguously worded labeling and product categorization standards. See USTR,
NTE(KOREA), supra note 54, at 256-66.
61. In Korea, frugality in individual life has long been regarded as a good moral virtue because of the
traditional agriculture-based economy. There are many popular folktales showing how frugality leads to
success.
62. See WTO: Korea, supra note 50. In 2000, Korea revealed that in Korea it would appear that frugality
or anti-import campaigns run by civic groups have either ceased or been avoided. However, there have been
anti-import campaigns led by the public organizations or trade associations; USTR, NTE (KOREA), supra note
54, at 258.
63. See WTO: Korea, supra note 50, at 258-59. For example, since 2000, the Korean government has
tried to improve Korean attitudes toward foreign cars, including sponsoring the first-ever Korea Import Motor
Show in Seoul, sponsoring a study to gain a better understanding of the foreign auto industry and educating
Korean policymakers and consumers on these issues. In 2001, in an unprecedented action, the Korean President
encouraged Koreans to consider buying an imported car. Seeking to eliminate the stigma associated with
purchasing a foreign car, in an important symbolic step, the Korean Government also planned to purchase 100
imported cars in 2002 and 2003 for use as highway patrol cars for Korea's National Police Agency, which
would be more than one-third of the agency's fleet.
64. One study in 2002 indicated such attitudes weaken the competitiveness of the Korean auto industry.
Id. at 277.
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biased against imports65 along with Korea's prevalent economic nationalism has
been difficult to overcome.
C. Japan
Anti-competitive practices in Japan are discussed from the viewpoints of
competition policy, transparency and exclusive business practices.' Structural
rigidity, excessive regulation and market access barriers characterize Japanese
competition policy. 67 There have been calls, both internally and externally, for the
Japanese economy to be further opened up and deregulated. 6 For most of the
post-war era, the principal goal of Japan's economic policy has been
development and stability,69 and free competition has sometimes been seen as
being inconsistent with that goal.70 Competition policies in such situations should
have been treated as regulation policies, not as organizing principles for the
economy,7 which has resulted in a regulation-based economy."
65. Id. at 257-58 (citing examples of anti-import campaigns led by public organizations or trade
associations in Korea).
66. Tony A, Freyer, Restrictive Trade Practices and Extra Territorial Application of Antitrust
Legislation in Japanese-American Trade, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 159, 170-71 (1999). The U.S.
government was concerned that the real cause of Japan's continuing trade surplus with America during the
1980s the failure of effective Japanese regulation of oligopolistic industrial sectors which excluded outsiders
from transactions through discriminatory devices in the distribution system, certain exclusionary business
practices, and perceived rigidities in the pricing mechanism. Id.
67. While Japan has reduced its formal tariff rates on imports to very low levels, overregulation has lied
at the heart of many market access problems faced by other countries. See USTR, NTE (JAPAN), 203 (2002)
available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2002/japan.pdf.
68. Motivations for deregulation in Japan have changed over time. In the 1980s, deregulation meant
privatization and administrative reform. Since the 1990s, however, the motivation came from a concern about
industrial structures and international competitiveness, which led to a domestic incentive for introducing
deregulation. See Hiroko Yamane, Deregulation and Competition Law Enforcement in Japan: Administratively
Guided Competition? 23 J. WORLD COMPETITION 3, 142 (2000).
69. Abbott, supra note 1, at 187. Economic stability has been regarded as presupposing a relatively high
level of government intervention in business planning.
70. Consequently, Japan's economy today suffers from overregulation and its concomitant inefficiency,
while at the same time Japanese social and labor conditions are relatively stable. This is different, for example,
from the case of the United States, which has placed a priority on firm profitability through free market
mechanism. The United States suffers from wide disparities in social and labor conditions and concomitant
destabilizing effects, while at the same time its economy enjoys a relatively high rate of productivity/ efficiency.
Id. at 187-88.
71. Michael Wise, Review of Competition Law and Policy in Japan, 1 OECD J. OF COMPETITION LAW &
POL'Y 71, 74 (1999) (reflecting the relative priorities of competition policy in Japan, "competition policy was
assigned to a separate agency, independent of the government but politically not strong enough to promote its
policies effectively).
72. Southwick, supra note 19, at 949. Japanese competition policy has been criticized as follows:
Although the cartels are prohibited by law, historically the law has provided numerous exceptions for particular
industries or circumstances. Also, the Japanese government, at times, has promoted coordination among
competitors and encouraged them to avoid excessive competition.
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Despite the government's recent focus on deregulation,73 in an attempt to
respond to internal and external requirements,74 overregulation in Japan has beenS 71
seen as hampering economic growth and raising the cost of doing business,
restraining efficiency, restricting competition, and impeding imports and foreign
investment.76 Regulations sometimes aim squarely at the entry of foreign goods
and services in an attempt to protect the status quo against market entrance,
consequently stifling entrepreneurship and inhibiting risk-taking and innovation.77
Although the structural reform has been interrupted over the past several years
due to the economic slowdown in Japan, the current Japanese economic situation
is deemed to be capable of, as well as imperative, a shift in policy goals from
"catch-up" development to consumer welfare.78 Trade partner countries, like the
United States,79 have positively pursued a multi-faceted approach which has
73. Japanese government, for example, has been working since 2002 to establish Special Zones for
Structural Reform that would plant the seeds of deregulation locally for subsequent growth nationwide. Prime
Minister Koizumi has made the zones the centerpiece of his drive to achieve bold regulatory reform in an
expeditious manner.
USTR, NTE (JAPAN), 194, 204 (2003) available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2003/japan.pdf.
74. Id. at 194. According to the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative
[hereinafter Regulatory Reform Initiative] operated by the United States and Japan which has been the main
vehicle for bilateral efforts to promote comprehensive deregulation and structural reform, Japan, for example,
addresses crosscutting issues, including competition policy, transparency, legal system reform, revision of
Japan's commercial law, and distribution. Within the context of the Regulatory Reform Initiative, the United
States continues to advocate the reform of laws, regulations, administrative guidance and other measures that
impede access for U.S. goods and services into Japan.
75. See USTR, NTE(JAPAN), supra note 67, at 211. (indicating that in 2002 the Japanese Government
had implemented a "foreign reference pricing" system for medical devices, which links prices in Japan to those
prevailing in other developed countries. This approach has been assessed as being arbitrary because it sets a cap
on prices without taking into full account the high cost of doing business in Japan.
76. Southwick, supra note 19, at 956. The central issue with regulatory barriers in Japan is seemingly a
bias against new entrants, new products, and lower prices, which may appear in regulations that are simply too
rigid or vague.
77. Id. at 965. The characteristics of the Japanese government regulations or measures were assessed as
follows:
The types of Japanese government measures ... almost never are discriminatory on their face.
Rather, measures ... discourage competition and limit market entry or expansion for new
domestic as well as foreign suppliers .... The entrenched suppliers protected by such regimes
most often are Japanese.... In such circumstances it is exceedingly difficult to prove... that
the government measures create conditions of competition adverse to foreign suppliers as
compared to like domestic suppliers.
Id.
78. Wise, supra note 71, at4.
79. Matsushita, supra note 11, at 249-50. From the 1950s to the 1970s the United States utilized
traditional trade remedies in an attempt to ward off challenges by Japanese enterprises that exported in the U.S.
market. From the 1980s, there has been an additional feature to the United States trade policy: the U.S.
government has claimed that there were structural impediments in the Japanese market which prevented U.S.
enterprises from gaining market access. Thus, major issues addressed by the United States government efforts
toward market access barriers in Japan have been as follows:
The market structure and business practice included restrictive distribution systems, entrenched
buyer-supplier relationships, and a reluctance to deal; regulations and government practices
restricting the approval of a new product or service, and government procurement practices
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centered upon structural reform and deregulation,8 0 believing that an essential
prerequisite for a vibrant economy is to secure a transparent, fair, predictable and
accountable regulatory system.' The inefficient and highly regulated Japanese
distribution system,82 as well as the cumbersome customs processing83  have
widely been recognized as significant trade and investment 
barriers.84
Distribution issues in Japan have been addressed by the trade partner countries
through three basic approaches: "1) as a matter of competition law, 2) through
deregulation of measures supporting restrictive distribution structures, and 3)
through agreements calling upon the Japanese government to use administrative
guidance and moral persuasion to loosen the tight relationships between Japanese
producers and distributors."' '85 In the year 2000, Japan abolished the Large-Scale
Retail Store Law, which had long been an obstacle to foreign investors 'and
exporters, and replaced it with the Large-Scale Retail Store Location Law
("SLL"). The new Law provides that regulation of large stores shall be based on
the degree to which a large store establishment or expansion affects the local
environment, and gives local governments the primary responsibility for the
86
regulation of large stores. However, critics of the new SLL argue: "The new
regime shifts the basis for store regulation from protecting small retailers to
preserving the physical environment. On its face, the SLL appears to represent a
liberalization of large store regulation. However, there is considerable skepticism
favoring Japanese suppliers; and cartels and collusive industry behavior, including 'private'
cartels as well as government measures requiring or allowing private regulations.
Id. As a result, the U.S. has required Japan to strengthen its monopoly act to remedy those barriers. Matsushita,
supra note 11, at 249-50.
80. Yamane, supra note 68, at 145. One survey shows the following two effects of deregulation in Japan
to be calculated: "i) an increase in consumption, as well as plant and equipment investment (demand effect); ii)
the effect on users corresponds to a reduction of the individual financial burden due to lower prices."
81. See USTR, NTE(JAPAN), supra note 73, at 194.
82. Southwick, supra note 19, at 927-28. For example, in gaining access to distribution in Japan, foreign
companies are often in a difficult situation:
The existence of long-term exclusive or semi-exclusive relationships between Japanese
manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers make it difficult for new products to enter into the
distribution networks." The problem more specifically is that.., the Japanese producers
possess significant power in the market and stand in a strong position with respect to the
distributors in their sector. In some cases, these producers have had exclusive contracts or
incentives for exclusive dealings. . . for new entrants, be they foreign or domestic.
Id.
83. See USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 73, at 206.
84. Southwick, supra note 19, at 928. Domination of the distribution system by Japanese producers can
create a significant market access problem in Japan because of the cost, risk, and difficulty of establishing an
alternative distribution network.
85. Id. at 929.
86. USTR, NTE (JAPAN), 224 (2001) available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2001/japan.pdf
There has been concern over the possibility for abuse or inconsistent application of the new law by local
governments in charge of its implementation.
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and fear that the new system may be more onerous and costly than was the
Large-Scale Retail Store Law.""s
Regarding transparency issues as trade barriers, over the past several years
Japan has taken significant measures to improve its regulatory system,88 however,
additional measures have been required to achieve a level of transparency89 and
accountability.' With regard to the Japanese rule making process, even though
public policy and regulations are made by and instituted through constant
interaction with the private sector,9' few opportunities exist for interested parties
who do not have special access to the authorities or related councils to have any
input into the legislative process.92 To solve this problem, Japan adopted its first
87. Jean Heilman Grier, Japan's Regulation of Large Retail Stores: Political Demands versus Economic
Interests, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 3 (2001).
88. See USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 67, at 215-1.6. The measures in the Three-Year Program by
the Japanese Government in 2001 for the transparency and accountability of the Japanese regulatory system, for
example, include:
The strict enforcement and promotion of the 1994 Administrative Procedure Law; increased
transparency of administrative guidance; full and effective enforcement of the Law Concerning
the Disclosure of Information Retained by Government Agencies; wide and effective use of
Public Comment Procedures; introduction of the 'No Action Letter' system; comprehensive
and objective evaluation of the regulatory process; and examination of the need, effects and
cost of new proposed regulations.
Id.
89. See Southwick, supra note 19, at 925. The matters relating to transparency in Japan would seem to
be difficult to solve, through WTO procedures, for example:
... [A]lthough basic legal rules often are plainly written in Japanese, the terms are very broad;
the all-important details often are filled in through non-transparent administrative guidance and
practice or through reliance on quasi-government advisory bodies or industry associations.
This kind of reliance on non-transparent means ... can make it difficult to demonstrate in a
WTO dispute settlement proceeding what rule the Japanese government is following.
Furthermore, . . . it still would be necessary ... to further persuade the panel how the
interaction between the governmental measures and the market situation restricts market
access.
Id.
90. See USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 73, at 203-05. (recognizing that authorities concerned must
justify to the public the rationale for adopting, changing, or continuing new or existing regulations, and must be
held accountable for their actions).
91. Ministries create deliberate councils (shingikai) to investigate some problem, draft legislation to deal
with the problem, or recommend alternative means of dealing with the problem. The goal of this
system is to gather expert opinion and provide an open forum.... Bureaucrats frequently, however,
use shingikai to diminish opportunities for open conflict in policy adjustments....
Ken Duck, Now That The Regulation Has Lifted: The Impact of Japan's Administrative Procedures Law on the
Regulation of Industry and Governance, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1686, 1699-1700 (1996). For instance,
shingikai are considered to be often mere extensions of the ministry or agency overseeing their deliberation.
David Boling, Access to Government-Held Information in Japan: Citizens' "Right to Know" Bows to the
Bureaucracy, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 20-21 (1998). Often bureaucrats frame the issue for deliberation and approve
background documents for use by the council members. The shingikai members are often to rely heavily upon
the resources supplied by the bureaucrats for some reason or other.
92. Higuchi Norio, Lecture on Japanese Information Disclosure, Mar. 1992, cited by David Boling,
supra note 91, at 3. In addition to being difficult to access the authorities in charge of legislations, it is difficult
to access government information about business. This is in sharp contrast with the United States: "The
American Freedom of Information Act... has worked so well that Japanese companies often obtain
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government-wide Public Comment Procedures in 1999, which requires central
government entities to give notice and invite public comments on draft
regulations.93 However, it has been evaluated to have only had marginal impact
on the substance of new regulations.94
Administrative guidance in Japan has been accessed as a traditional tool of
Japanese government policy95 and is the key to the lack of transparency.
96 The
Japanese legal environment has increased the effectiveness of administrative
guidance in industrial policy as follow: "Japan's informal regulatory process
functions within a legal system that consists of a ministry's statutory authority
limited by administrative rules and doctrines of judicial review that are designed
as a check against arbitrary policies. In Japan, courts grant ministries' broad
discretion in their regulatory methods because of vaguely worded statutes.
Combined with low levels of judicial review, this broad discretionary authority
insulates much of Japan's industrial policy from challenge.
97 This 'opaqueness'
inherent in this excessive or extensive use of informal directives or
administrative guidance99 has traditionally been evaluated as impeding access to
information about their American competitors through the United States Freedom of Information Act requests.
However, American companies have no similar access." Id. With regard to this matter, the following comment
is notable: "Japanese government . . . often exclusively possess economically strategic information .... thus
forcing smaller companies ... to hire former bureaucrats in order to gain access to important business
information." Id. at 4, n. 16. This absence (and insufficient implementation) of a Japanese information disclosure
law have been criticized as one kind of a non-tariff trade barriers. Id. at 4.
93. USTR, NTE(JAPAN), supra note 73, at 204.
94. Id. To make the Public Comment Procedures a useful and effective regulatory mechanism, the
United States urges the Japanese Government in 2002 to:
"i) establish a centralized system that would allow parties to find solicitations of public
comments . .. preferably on the Internet; ii) require the use of a minimum 30 day comment
period; and iii) undertake the legal steps necessary to incorporate the Public Comment
Procedures into the Administrative Procedure Law, a move that would strengthen it from a
mere guideline to a law."
Id.
95. GATI Panel Report, Japan Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, Nov. 18, 1981,
GAITr B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) 66 (1988), cited by Southwick, supra note 19, at 966.
96. See Duck, supra note 91, at 1709-1 1.Various kinds of administrative guidance in Japan could be
grouped into three categories: "i) promotional; ii) adjudicatory; and iii) regulatory. Out of these three,
regulatory guidance has traditionally been used as a non-statutory means of regulating private conduct,
particularly in areas that involve non-domestic trade, which has continuously been criticized due to a lack of
transparency."
97. Frank K.Upham, Law and Social Change in Post War Japan. 169 (1987), cited by Duck, supra note
91, at 1703.
98. Yamane, supra note 68, at 155. The chronic feature of administrative guidance in Japan has thus
been described:
In Japan, the government has traditionally guided private enterprises ... , through highly
complex systems of administrative guidance .... Such guidance has been ultimately based on
the Acts ... but the response to administrative action has been quick, flexibility has been
ensured, and administrative objectives have been achieved smoothly. The OECD report of
1999 has characterized this as 'pragmatic incrementalism.' Although the institution of
administrative guidance has been reformed .... the legacy of past traditions is ... difficult to
change rapidly.
Id.
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Japanese markets.99 The Administrative Procedure Law 1993' 00 ("APL") requires
that the government provide, upon request, in writing, a copy of administrative
guidance to a private party, which is required to be amended so that all
administrative guidance is issued in writing.'°'
Trade barriers, in relation to transparency, also exist in the sphere of self-
regulation by private organizations and special public corporations (tokushu hojin).
In Japan, private sector regulations (min-min kisei) are regarded as playing an
exclusionary role. Factors behind regulatory practices in the private sector include
involvement of the public sector, -such as administrative guidance, the absence of
public rules to maintain fair competition in areas providing essential facilities, bid
rigging, and a poor information disclosure system. Particularly, trade associations
create government-business relationships through which government information has
been channeled.' Under such self-regulating system, for example, the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission ("JFTC") "allows fair trade associations (essentially, private trade
associations) to set their own promotion standards0 3 which may be stricter than
required by the Commission through the self-imposed fair competition code."' 04 It
has also been recommended that private regulations be transparent and monitored
closely, and that the provisions providing exemption for fair trade associations from
the Antimonopoly Act ("AMA") should be abolished.' 5
Exclusive business practices,' °6 including corporate alliances and exclusive
buyer-supplier networks,'0 7 have been a crosscutting issue in trade relations with
other trade partner countries. ' 8 A key reason for the persistence of anti-competitive
99. Duck, supra note 91, at 1687.
100. Id. at 1689. In response to criticism of Japanese regulatory practices and the shift of Japanese
industrial base overseas, Japan established the Administrative Procedures Law. The design of the Law is to
clarify regulatory procedures by promulgating uniform rules regarding government procedures for applications,
dispositions, administrative guidance, and notifications.
101. See Boling, supra note 91, at 16 n.98. Although there was an optimistic reaction to the passing of
APL, it has been criticized because it failed to reign in the use of administrative guidance and because
corporations remain reluctant to take on the bureaucrats.
102. Yamane, supra note 68, at 150-58.
103. See USTR, NTE(JAPAN), supra note 73, at 222. They usually develop and enforce industry-
specific ruling limiting or regulating, among other things, fees, commissions, rebates, advertising, and labeling
for the purpose of maintaining orderly competition among their members, and often among non-members.
104. Id. at 223. By the end of 2002, there were 39 JFTC-authorized private premium codes. For
example, under the Law Against Unjustified Premiums and Misleading Representations, overly restrictive limits
especially by the "fair trade association" are imposed on the use of premium offers (prizes) and other sales
promotion techniques. Foreign newcomers, with innovative sales techniques, are significantly impaired under
such restrictions.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 222 (noting the typical type of exclusionary business in Japan).
107. Southwick, supra note 19, at 928. These networks have traditionally been maintained by the
exclusive contracts or incentives: "examples of incentives for exclusive dealing include rebate systems, access
to manufacturer credit and other financial ties, requirements for the distributor to notify the producer before
dealing with another supplier, exchanges of personnel, and systems for inventory control." Id.
108. Id. at 956 (indicating that private anticompetitive practices could undermine the benefits of
regulatory reform as follows: ". . . one may be cheered by the gradual progress of regulatory reform in Japan,
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business practices in Japan" is the historically weak antitrust enforcement record of
the JFTC."0 The Commission's record of reluctance to initiate formal investigations
of market access, which concerns countries, stems from its practice of requiring a
near-absolute proof of an ongoing competition law violation before it begins
investigating, as well as from a natural resistance to foreign pressure."' Arguably,
such a high threshold for opening investigations masks a fundamental difference in
the philosophy or capability of competition enforcement between Japan and other
western countries like the United States."12 The Commission has routinely faced
domestic and external criticism for its lack of bureaucratic clout and inability to
exercise its enforcement powers aggressively."' To make the matter worse, the
provision of Japanese Antimonopoly Law has not only stultified the development of
antitrust doctrines in Japan, but at the same time it has allowed the JFTC to centralize
the competition agenda, which results in a bureaucratic approach to the law where
''power is not shared with the courts.'"'
4
By constraining market mechanisms, exclusionary business practices would
reduce the choices available to businesses and consumers, raise the cost of goods
and services, discourage competitors from entering the Japanese market with
innovations, and impede the development of new industries and technologies.
These would eventually exact a heavy toll on the Japanese economy.
but it would be far premature to assume that the types of concerns raised in the past about regulatory market
access barriers in Japan will not continue to arise for some time to come."). For example, in 2001, legislation
has provided for private actions to seek injunctions against alleged violators of the AMA in order to help
reinforce the enforceability of the law. However, there has been concern about the insufficient provisions of the
new legislation and the lack in capacity of the Japanese court system to implement the new legislation. USTR,
NTE(JAPAN), supra note 73, at 202.
109. Southwick, supra note 19, at 924-25. The ability to treat with these types of barriers in Japan
through WTO procedures is limited:
"The regulations of concern often make no distinctions between foreign and domestic
businesses.... WTO dispute resolution generally is not able to address private anti-
competitive or market-restrictive practices or structure.... Even when the fact pattern shows
a fairly clear distinction between the position of foreign and Japanese companies, the
Japanese government often can present a coherent policy rationale for the regulations that is
unrelated to restricting market access by foreign companies ..
Id.
110. Wise, supra note 71, at 38. The JFrC's record concerning market openness issues is known to be
unclear. The JFTC has declared it would deal fairly and strictly with problems of market access, applying the
principle of non-discrimination, but it has seemed to be difficult to identify law enforcement efforts with that
focus. The adequacy of competition enforcement, including actions against impediments to market access, was
major issue in trade negotiations with the United States, and has also been an issue in controversies with the
European Union.
111. Southwick, supra note 19, at 974-75.
112. Id.
113. See USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 73, at 202-03 (noting the factors to limit the effectiveness of
the JFTC's enforcement against hard-core AMA violations).
114. Harry First, Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 137, 147 (1995), cited by Boling,
supra note 91, at 14. Thus if the JF'C acts informally, which is after the case, it can "extinguish completely the
private right of action.. . rather than proceeding to a formal decision." Id.
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D. Review
Japan and Korea have traditionally and commonly been criticized by their
advanced trade-partner countries as having weak enforcement of competition
policies, especially as compared with other trade related government policies.
This might be the inevitable result of the fact that the predominant goal of the
two countries' economic policy has been to secure development and stability. It
has also been indicated that corporate restructure reform and deregulation has not
been promoted by harmful side effects, specifically the government's extensive
involvement in the private sector, especially in the case of Korea after its
economy's initial recovery from the financial difficulties in 1997. The lack of
transparency within the two countries has commonly existed in rulemaking and
implementation " 5 of the trade and competition-related rules. Such lack of
transparency gives regulators wide discretion. Regulations could be applied more
adversely to the foreign firms than to the domestic firms, and impede
predictability in doing business in their domestic markets.
Thus, Japan and Korea have faced demands because their competition policy,
law, and enforcement should be operating in a more market-based direction
notwithstanding their governments' sustained efforts to enhance their level of
enforcement of competition-related policy and regulations. The reasons for such
criticism may more or less be related to their respective governments' long-
standing policy: giving relatively positive consideration to economic growth,
rather than to the consumers' welfare level during the course of their economic
development.
Additionally, the two countries have commonly been confronted with trade
pressures from their trade partner countries. However, the requirements imposed
on Japan seem to be more specific and concrete than those imposed on Korea.
This difference may reflect the relative importance of the Japanese market for
those partner countries and the far-more advanced level of Japanese economy.
Japan and Korea's trade partners demand that the two countries' governments
should pay more attention to competition policy in order to internally enhance the
consumers' welfare level as well as to harmonize their policies externally with
those of other advanced countries.
In Korea, frugality campaigns and the anti-import biased social atmosphere
have traditionally been pointed out as being substantial impediments to
international trade. Meanwhile in Japan, the exclusionary business practices have
been regarded as significantly restricting the access of foreign businesses to the
domestic market. The anti-import biased social atmospheres in Korea and the
exclusionary business practices in Japan are similar in having restrictive effects
on foreign exporters and investors. However, they seem somewhat different from
115. For example, administrative guidance in Korea has not been published nor publicly noticed and has
tended to be applied flexibly or arbitrally to businesses, which is similar to Japan.
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the viewpoint that the former atmosphere could be very temporary and extremely
vulnerable to changes in the overall social atmosphere or consumption attitudes
in Korea, ' 16 while the latter practices might take time to change because they are
the products of the long-standing commercial practices of the business society in
Japan.
III. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES BETWEEN FRONTIERS
A. International Regulation
1. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
The Uruguay Round Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measure ("SPS Agreement") was created due to concern that
elimination or reduction of agriculture-specific tariff and non-tariff measures"'
would be circumvented by protectionist measures disguised in the form of
sanitary or phytosanitary regulations in parallel with major agricultural trade
negotiations."' Before the SPS Agreement, food safety, animal, and plant health
regulations were made under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 1979
("TBT Agreement") and GAFF," 9 under which Members could introduce
potentially trade-restrictive regulations in the pursuit of a "legitimate" objective.
Considering the concern about possible disguised restrictions on international
trade under TBT Agreement and Article XX of GATT, the SPS Agreement
provides an expanded and clearer set of rules and principles1
2 0 regulating the
application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
2 ' The SPS and TBT
Agreement are complementary, 22 but different in their design.
23 The SPS
116. For example, in the field of motor vehicles, which has been indicated as the typical case to show
the frugality campaigns and anti-import bias in Korea, market demand in 2002 increased in direct response to
the President's public statements encouraging Koreans to purchase imported cars followed by the temporary
tax-incentive measures. USTR, NTE (KOREA), supra note 54, at 257-58.
117. "As the importance of ... [trade barriers] diminished .. .the world trading regime turned its
attention to other issues .. .such as licensing requirements, safety and health standards, and other domestic
measures that [restricted] the importation of foreign goods and services, or disproportionately disadvantage[ed]
such goods and services once they entered the country. Such measures are [of course] much harder to identify
and even harder to remove than simple tariffs and quotas." Michael K. Young, supra note 5, at 769.
118. "The SPS Agreement applies, inter alia, to measures to protect human life from risks arising from
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-carrying organisms in foods and beverages." JOHN H. JACKSON, ET
AL., supra note 12, at 539.
119. GATT art, XX, General Exceptions.
120. The Agreement on Agriculture contains not only rule-based commitments, but also quantitative
commitments to reduce protection while the SPS Agreement does not impose any quantitative and legally
binding schedules of concessions.
121. Herewith, sanitary measures are those related to human or animal health, and phytosanitary
measures deal with plant health. WTO, SPS Agreement, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis.e/eol/e/world.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
122. For example, the TBT agreement defines its scope in part through reference to the SPS Agreement.
TBT Agreement, art. 1.5.
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Agreement contains rules, principles, and benchmarks for WTO Members to
ensure and to justify sanitary as well as phytosanitary measures not constituting
disguised restrictions on international trade.' 24
2. Import Licensing
The GATT'25 deals with import licensing 26 in a general manner. The Tokyo
Round Import Licensing Code 27 for preventing import licensing procedures from
restricting international trade' 28 was revised to strengthen the disciplines on
transparency and notifications in the WTO Agreement on the Import License.
The main objectives of the WTO Agreement are to simplify, and bring
transparency to procedures, to ensure fair and equitable application and
administration, and to prevent procedures from being restrictive or distort to
imports. 1
29
Members apply import-licensing procedures neutrally, and administer them
in a fair and equitable manner.'30 Applications or licensed imports are not to be
131 .132refused for minor documentation errors"' or minor variations. Import licensing
is divided into two kinds: automatic import licensing'33 and non-automatic import' 34
licensing. Automatic licensing procedures are not to be administered in such a
way as to have restrictive effects on imports and not to discriminate among those
applying for licenses. Under such licensing any person meeting the legal
123. The differences between them are:
First, while the SPS Agreement provides an affirmative defense explaining the general
exceptions in the GATT, the TBT Agreement explains the obligations contained in the
GATT .... Second, the scope of the SPS Agreement is well defined and relatively
narrow .... the scope of the TBT Agreement is extremely broad and diverse. Consequently,
the TBT Agreement contains mainly procedural requirements with few substantive
obligations.... Agreement's principal and not in significant contribution to the international
trading system has been assessed to promote transparency and information exchange.
Craig Thorm & Marinn Carlson, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 841 (2000).
124. See SPS Agreement, art. 2.3.
125. GAT art. VI, Fees and Formalities Connected with Importation and Exportation.
126. Import licensing means administrative procedures requiring the submission of an application or
other documentation to the relevant authority as a prior condition for importation. WTO Agreement on Import
Licensing, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/eol/e/world.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2003).
127. GATT, 26th Supp. BISD 154 (1980), cited by JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., supra note 12, at 431, n.4.
128. Id. at 431.
129. WTO Agreement on the Import License, Preamble.
130. Id. atart. 1.3.
131. Id. atart. 1.7.
132. Id. at art. 1.8.
133. Automatic licensing procedures are defined as import licensing where the approval of the
application is granted in all cases. WTO Agreement on the Import License, art. 2.1.
134. Non-automatic import licensing is applied to administer trade restrictions such as quantitative
restrictions subject to be within the WTO legal framework. Id. at art. 3.1.
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requirements should be equally eligible to apply for and immediately obtain
import licenses. Under non-automatic import licensing procedure, if a license is
refused, the applicant, on request, shall be given the reason for refusal and shall
have a right of appeal or review of the decision.
3 Members are to publish in
advance all relevant information,
' and are required to notify the Committee on
Import Licensing of the relative information,
"7 in case of instituting licensing
procedures or changing these procedures.
"8
B. Technical Regulation/Standards
Recently the individual countries' policy for technical regulations and standards
have become significant as the result of higher living standards worldwide, which
have boosted consumers' demands for safe, high-quality, and environmentally
friendly products. However, this may impede international trade by increasing the
costs for producers and exporters as they comply with different foreign technical
regulations and standards. Thus, divergent regulations among the countries may
become technical barriers to trade.3
9 As a result, there has been an international effort
to prohibit individual countries from adopting and applying technical regulations and
standards to protect domestic industries.
The provisions of GATT 1947 contained only a general reference to technical
regulations and standards.' 40 However, after years of work by the GAT[ working
group, the plurilateral Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("Tokyo Round
Standards Code") was concluded in 1979 to limit the use of standards and technical
regulations as trade barriers. 4 ' The code laid down the rules for preparation,
adoption, application of technical regulation standards,
14 2 and conformity assessment
procedures,' 3 which have been strengthened and clarified by the WTO Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade ('TBT Agreement").
135. Id. at art. 3.5(e).
136. Id. at art. 3.3, 3.4, 3.5(b)-(d).
137. Such notifications should include information on substantial and procedural requirements in import
licensing. Id. at art. 5.1-5.5.
138. Id. at art. 5.1-5.4
139. For the examples of the technical barriers to trade particularly in European Union and Japan, see
Richard Schaffer, Beverley Earler, Filiberto Agusti, International Business Law and its Environment, 334-
337(2002).
140. GATT 1947, arts. III, XI and XX.
141. See Richard Schafferm et al., supra note 144, at 338-39.
142. Herewith, technical regulations and standards set out specific characteristics of a product including
a product's process and production methods. The difference between a standard and a technical regulation is
that while conformity with standards is voluntary, technical regulations are by nature mandatory, which have
different implications for international trade. Id. at 333.
143. Conformity assessment procedures are technical procedures-such as testing, verification, inspection
and certification-which confirm that products meet the requirements imposed by the regulations and standards.
Non-transparent and discriminatory operation of such procedures may affect adversely the international trade.
See id. at 334-35.
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When importing products, non-compliance with a technical regulation of the
importing country shall prohibit the sale in the domestic market, while non-
compliance with a standard will affect the market share there. The objectives of
technical regulations and standards are protection of human safety, health of
animal and plant life, the environment, prevention of deceptive practices,
technical harmonization, and trade facilitation.'"
Technical barriers to trade generally result from the preparation, adoption,
and application of different technical regulations and conformity assessment
procedures which may have legitimate origins, such as differences in local tastes
or levels of income, as well as geographical or other factors. 41 Conformity
assessment procedures may become obstacles to trade when they are stricter or
more time-consuming procedures than are necessary to assess a product's
compliance with the technical regulations of the importing country.'" Like in
other WTO Agreements, under the TBT Agreement,. the MFN and national
treatment provisions apply to technical regulations and conformity assessment
procedures. 141
For many years, there have been international efforts working towards the
international conformity of standards,'4  which have had major impact on
international trade, especially in the fields of industrial products. Considering the
difficulties in securing approval for domestic products on foreign markets, the
TBT Agreement strongly encourages WTO Members to adopt the mutual
acceptance of conformity assessment results,' 49 and to arrive at a mutual
understanding regarding the competence of the conformity assessment bodies."O
The Code of Good Practice"' contained in the TBT Agreement, which member
countries must comply with, provides for transparency in preparation, adoption
and application of standards by all public or private institutes.'52
144. TBT Agreement. art. 2.2.
145. Regarding the reasons for complication and inhibition of international trade in relation with
technical regulation, see JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., supra note 12, at 538-39.
146. They include information requirements, setting of facilities to carry out conformity assessment, and
the selection of samples. TBT Agreement. art. 5.2.3, 5.2.6.
147. TBT Agreement. art. 2.1
148. They were led mainly by the International Standardization Organization, the International Electro-
technical Commission and the International Telecommunication Union. The most commonly known standard
since 1987 is ISO9000, which is the standard used for assuring product quality through product design and
manufacturing process. IS014000 standards will provide guidelines for environmental management and
labeling. Richard Schaffer, et al., supra note 144, at 338.
149. TBT Agreement. art. 6.3.
150. TBT Agreement. art. 6.1.
151. TBT Agreement. Annex 3, Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of
Standards.
152. C.F. TBT Agreement, Code of Good Practice, Provision E.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 17
C Korea
Regarding the regulation on customs clearance, despite the steps the Korean
Government has recently taken,' import clearance, particularly of agricultural
products, remains excessively regulated and procedures continue to be arbitrary. '
Such excessive and arbitrary regulation on clearance restricts access to Korean
domestic markets resulting in added costs for both importers and consumers, which
may, be a breach of the SPS Agreement.'55
Classifications and their changes are often based on arbitrary standards, 5 6 which is
in breach of the provisions of the WTO Agreement, 7 and at odds with other OECD
member practices.' 8 Customs clearance applications have routinely been rejected on
administrative grounds, in breach of the provisions stipulated in WTO agreement,1
59
which delays the customs clearance process.'60 The Korean government entrusts local
trade associations to certify or approve import documentation, and then requires
importers to submit confidential business information and to pay an additional fee.''
Such practices could be construed as deviating from the spirit and principle of WTO
Agreements.' 62 Korea, contrary to. the international trend, also does not accept
European Union Certificates of Origin despite Europe's rapid change towards a single
economic entity.
153. After WTO dispute settlement consultations with the United States between 1995 and 1999, the
Korean government tried to reform its import clearance procedures by employing sanitary and phytosanitary
measures:
1) expediting clearance for fresh fruits and vegetables; 2) instituting a new sampling, testing
and inspection regime; 3) eliminating some non-science-based phytosanitary requirements; 4)
revising the Korean Food and Food Additives Codes to be in conformity with CODEX
Alimentarius standards; and 5) requiring ingredient listing by percentage for major, rather
than for all, ingredients.
The Korean government streamlined customs clearance procedures by, inter alia, introducing an immediate
release system and the progressive introduction of paperless clearance through a computer network linking
customs office. USTR, NTE (KOREA), supra note 54, at 242-44.
154. (For example, the Korea Customs Service has been indicated frequently to classify blended
products under the Harmonized System disadvantageously to the blended products imported, which usually has
a higher tariff rate and has been indicated to be contrary to the international standards. USTR, NTE (KOREA),
supra note 54, at 26.
155. See SPS Agreement, art. 2.3.
156. For the examples of misclassification for the products in Korea, see USTR, NTE (KOREA), supra
note 54, at 244.
157. WTO Agreement on the Import License. art. 1.3.
158. USTR, NTE (KOREA), supra note 54, at 244.
159. WTO Agreement on the Import License. art. 1.7. Such administrative grounds have been, for
example, wrong print, font size and erasure marks on the application.
160. For example, "[wihile import clearance for most agricultural products required less than 3 to 4 days
in other Asian countries, in Korea, import clearance for new products still typically takes 10 to 18 days, and 4 to
6 months if a food additive is not specifically recognized in Korea's Food Additive Code for use in the
product". USTR, NTE (Korea), supra note 54, at 242.
161. See id. at 244.
162. For example, it could be inconsistent with the provision of TRIPS to require the proper protection
of business secrets submitted to the authorities concerned. See TRIPS, art. 39.3.
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Further work is required to bring Korea's food code standards up to international
standards, 63 to alter clearance procedures in primary food products so that they are
based on science and are consistent with international trade rules and norms,'6 and to
introduce positively the fast track system in customs clearance.
65
Regarding technical regulation and standards, Korea has made efforts to reduce
the impact of technical regulations and standards on trade and to bring them more
into line with international rules'6 since the financial crisis of 1997. However, Korea
maintains standards and conformity assessment procedures, such as sampling,
inspection, testing and certification, that deviate from international practices or
norms 67 and seemingly have an improper impact on imports.
68
Korea also allows data submitted for approval/certification'69 to be protected• 170
upon written request, except when it is deemed contrary to the "public interest.
' 17'
This is in line with the exception to the non-disclosure obligation under the TRIPS
Agreement. 72 The definition of public interest, however, is so vague that it has given
the concerned authorities room for wide discretion and the data that original
exporters submitted have been released to local competitors.
73
163. See SPS Agreement, art. 3.1.
164. See SPS Agreement, art. 2.2
165. For an example of improper classification of products followed by time-consuming approval
procedures and onerous, cost-increasing examination procedures, see USTR, NTE (KOREA), supra note 54, at
245.
166. They were made through the revisions of the Processing Standards and Ingredient Specifications
for Livestock Products in 2000, and of the Food Code, Food Additive Code, and Labeling Standards, in 2001.
USTR, NTE (KOREA), supra note 54, at 239-247.
167. For example, Korea has not effectively adopted the "generally recognized as safe" standard. USTR,
NTE (KOREA), supra note 54, at 245. Regarding this matter, the TBT Agreement encourages Members to use
existing international standards for their national rules in technical-related regulations, standards, and
conformity assessment procedures. TBT Agreement, art. 5.4.
168. See TBT Agreement (Preamble) (Desiring however to ensure that technical regulations do not
create unnecessary obstacles to international trade); see also TBT Agreement art. 2.2.
169. This data requires extraordinary detail. See USTR, NTE (KOREA), supra note 54, at 246 (2003).
See also TBT Agreement, art. 5.2.3 (requiring information in connection with conformity assessment
procedures to be limited to what is necessary to assess conformity.)
170. The categorization of test data as a subject matter of intellectual property under Article 1.2 of the
TRIPS Agreement does not mean that their protection shall be put on the same footing as other intellectual
property rights. In particular, it does not indicate that such data should be protected through a grant of exclusive
rights. Carlos Maria Correa, Public Health and International Law: Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS
Agreement: Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 69, 72
(2002).
171. The confidentiality of information about products submitted in connection with conformity
assessment should be respected in such a manner that legitimate commercial interests are protected. TBT
Agreement, art. 5.2.4.
172. Correa, supra note 175, at 76. The application of this exception is subject to a necessity test. In
determining necessity, GATTIWTO rules and jurisprudence generally provide deference to member states to
determine when a necessity arises, but often impose a heavy burden of proof on the member invoking.
173. This may allow these products to have their patents infringed upon and used for marketing in
Korea. USTR, NTE (KOREA), supra note 54, at 246.
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Korea has recently taken a number of steps to improve the business climate,
particularly in pharmaceuticals'74 and cosmetics,75 including implementation of
self-regulation'7 6 and improvements in labeling requirements.'77 However, in
some industrial sectors, the trade partner countries have been concerned about the
vagueness of the provisions, the lack of transparency in the process, 79 and local
testing'8° and standards requirements" ' which are still onerous, slow and difficult
compared with other counties,'8 2 in arguable contrast with the provisions of SPS
Agreement."'
The Korean government implemented mandatory biotechnology labeling
requirements for food products enhanced through biotechnology [known as
genetically modified organisms ("GMO's")] and for some processed foods with
only vague and limited provisions. ' The requirements are suspected of leaving
room for arbitrary and inconsistent interpretations by government officials, being
far more burdensome than necessary to achieve its stated policy goal of providing
Korean consumers with clear information,'" and appearing to raise national
treatment concerns as well.'86
174. See id. at 259-61. Korea has been seeking to cut health-care costs and has adopted a variety of new
measures to achieve this goal, of which many seem to have failed. The Korean government often has developed
such proposals in a seemingly piecemeal manner without adequate input from domestic or foreign stakeholders.
This exemplifies a piecemeal manner of Korean government in relation with the measures in the area of
pharmaceuticals.
175. See id. at 262 (outlining the improvement and its insufficiency in cosmetics sector.)
176. Self-regulation in the cosmetics sector of Korea has been more reasonable and loosened compared
with government regulation, which differs from the Japanese private-sector regulation that has generally been
criticized by the trade partner countries as demonstrated above. See id., at 261.
177. Id. at 247. For example, in 2002, mandatory Korean-language labeling of product type for most
products was eliminated and foreign languages may be used on the label.
178. Seeid. at257.
179. Id. These transparency-related problems continue to be serious problems for market entry in a wide
variety of sectors, including agriculture, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and automotives.
180. See USTR, NTE (KOREA), supra note 54, at 246. (providing an example of requiring redundant
local test data which might be expensive, inefficient, and scientifically unsound.) These practices might be in
breach of the provisions of TBT Agreement, arts. 2.2, 5.4, and 6.1.
181. For Korea's motor vehicle standards and certification procedures serving as market access barriers,
see USTR, NTE (KOREA), supra note 54, at 246.
182. For the concerns about the packaging/labeling standards and promotional packing in several sectors
raised by trade partner countries like the United States, see id. at 244-47.
183. See SPS Agreement, arts. 3, 7, and 8.
184. USTR, NTE(KOREA), supra note 54, at 247.
185. Technical regulations should not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate
objective and taking into account the risks that non-fulfillment would create. TBT Agreement, art. 2.2.
186. Members shall treat, in respect of technical regulations, products imported from other Member no
less favorable than like products of national origin and from other countries. TBT Agreement, art. 2.1.
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D. Japan
Regarding the regulation on customs clearance, the Japanese government has
been criticized by trade partner countries for anti-competitive practices relating to
sanitary and phytosanitary measures that have improperly been manipulated to
impede international trade, 87 violating the obligations under the SPS Agreement. 88
While Japan has made progress in establishing quarantine-related standards in
agreement with internationally recognized levels,' it is still necessary for it to
remove the anti-competitive practices in relation with the sanitary and phytosanitary
measures.'O Trade partner countries have sought to require the Japanese government
to adopt transparent inspection procedures in order to reduce unscientific,'
excessive, unnecessary,' 92 and trade distorting requirements for some products.' 93 The
Japanese government has begun to improve quarantine regulations, including
implementation of a non-quarantine pest list, which seems to be an important
positive step' 94 but not completely sufficient.' 95
Despite progress in recent years, 96 particularly under the Regulatory Reform
Initiative, 7 Japanese import clearance procedures are considered cumbersome in
comparison with standards of other industrial countries', which results in trade
187. USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 73, at 211. Japan has traditionally been assessed as being
conservative on questions involving food safety, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, having many import
standards that limit trade in farm and forest products. However, recently there appears to have been an increase
in Japan's use of standards and other administrative requirements to limit agricultural imports and a greater
tendency to deviate from scientific principles in setting new import policies.
188. "Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a
disguised restriction on international trade, and shall be enforced and adopted in order to minimize their
negative effects on trade." SPS Agreement Preamble, arts. 2.3.
189. Mainly through revisions of the Food Sanitation Law, Japan has been working to harmonize its
national regulations with the provisions of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement. See USTR, NTE
(JAPAN), supra note 86, at 234.
190. For example, the Japanese government requires that a foreign country's certified organic products
are certified again by government-accredited organizations based in Japan after they have met third-party
certification requirements for organic foods, which has been considered extremely burdensome to exporters. See
USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 86, 236.
191. W'TO members shall apply any sanitary or phytosanitary measures on scientific principles and shall
not maintain them where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient. See SPS Agreement. art. 2.2.
192. Japanese quarantine requirements for fire blight, for example, include mandatory tree-by-tree
inspections and a strict requirement of "buffer" zone, which have been asserted to unnecessarily raise costs and
reduce competitiveness of imported apples in Japan. USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 73, at 211.
193. For example, Japanese plant quarantine regulations require fumigation on a number of imported
fresh horticultural products, which is particularly indicated to be detrimental to their trade. Japanese
government, however, does not require fumigation of infected locally grown products. See id. at 212. These
may be in breach of the concerned provisions of SPS Agreement Preamble, art. 2 (that mandates members to
minimize the negative effects on trade).
194. W'TO members shall recognize the concepts of pest-free area. SPS Agreement, art. 6.2.
195. For example, the exemption list in quarantine does not include common insects found on imported
products, some of which are known to occur in Japan. USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 67, at 225.
196. See id. at 219 (detailing the progress made by Japan).
197. See Matsushita, supra note 11.
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disputes with other trade partner countries. 9 8 Japan is required to adopt a system
to reduce import clearance processing,'" to calculate dutiable import values on a
"free on board" rather than a "cost, insurance, freight" basis, and to increase the
import deminimi value for exemption from user fee.2°°
Regarding technical regulation/standards, Japan has undertaken to simplify,
harmonize, and eliminate restrictive standards in accordance with international
practices. However, standards or certification-related problems unique to Japan," '
with no apparent scientific reasons, continue to obstruct access to Japan's markets.
The profile use of technical requirements in Japan is rooted in Japan's protective
attitude toward consumers, the historical role of the Japanese government in
economic life, and the Japanese people's acceptance of governmental regulation of
business. °3
Several products, like genetically modified foods, dietary supplements, and food
additives have traditionally been subject to disputes with other trade partner countries
about disguised trade restrictions.2' With regard to biotechnology, Japan has adopted
a largely scientific approach in its approval process for genetically modified foods
201with mandatory labeling requirements. Some processed food imported into Japan
198. See USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 73, at 206.
199. This request is consistent with the risk management principles provided in Chapter 6 (Customs
Control) of the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures
(Revised TOKYO Convention), which encourages signatories to ease restrictive regulations. The Council of
World Customs Organization adopted the revised texts and the Protocol of Amendment in June 1999. The
amendments will be effective as soon as the Protocol enters into force, which requires the accession of 40
Contracting Parties to the 1973 Convention. See generally, the Revised Kyoto Convention, available at
http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/topics-issues/FacilitationCustomsProcedures/kyoto/kyreport.htmi (last visited
Sept. 17, 2003). For the measures required for development, see USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 73, at 206.
200. It is estimated that an increase in the deminimi value would facilitate clearance and decrease
custom's workload, especially at postal facilities. USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 67, at 219. This
measurement to increase the deminimi value will be in line with the guidelines in Chapter 4 (Duties and Taxes)
of the Revised TOKYO Convention stating in part 'the collection and payment of duties and taxes should not be
required for negligible amounts of revenue that incur costly paperwork, both for customs administration and for
the importer/exporter.'
201. Those safety or standards are sometimes supported by the concerned Japanese industries. USTR,
NTE (JAPAN), supra note 86, at 223.
202. Id. at 211.
203. RICHARD SCHAFFER, ET AL., supra note 139, at 337.
204. For example, burdensome or restrictive approval procedures for new entrants of products or rates
would be disadvantageous to innovation regardless of the nationality of the innovator. However, the bias against
innovation seems to be a genuine bias against foreign suppliers. Potential WTO arguments for addressing this
type of issue in theory might include violations of "national treatment" principles, "non-violation nullification
or impairment," or possibly arguments under the TBT Agreement or the GATS provisions on domestic
regulation. Southwick, supra note 19, at 964-65.
205. The trade partner countries are concerned that mandatory labeling requirement to some GM foods
would discourage consumers from purchasing them by reminding them of a health risk. According to the
Japanese Government, the objective of this requirement is "to reassure consumers that these foods have been
approved as safe by the Government of Japan." USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 73, at 212. These debates
would be based on art. 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
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has at times been in conflict with Japan's safety standards,'06 although the food may
have met international safety standards.0 7
Japan allows producers of certain food products, like dietary supplements, to
make nutritional and health benefit claims with the scientific data in marketing
their products.0 8 However, trade partner countries raised concerns regarding the
type of data that might be required to make such claims. 20 9 The data requirements
of the regulatory system are required to be reasonable and appropriate, and
limited to that necessary to ensure safety and efficacy.2 0 Furthermore, regulatory
decisions should be based on clear scientific grounds, taking into full
consideration all available data and information.2
The Japanese safety standards and regulations, which have been regarded as
unique,2 2 should balance the need for data with the requirement to complete a
timely safety review and adopt regulations to protect consumers without
impeding international trade.1 3
E. Review
With relation to customs procedures, while Japan has much room to improve
the cumbersome procedures making clearance matters inefficient, Korea has been
criticized due to its deliberate customs classifications, its rejection of customs
clearance applications on simple administrative grounds, and the improper
implementation of private clearance procedures. The two countries are required
to improve the processing of import clearance, and to reduce or eliminate the
excessive, discretionary, unnecessary and particularly trade-distorting quarantine
requirements.
There is an international trend toward concentrating negotiations heavily on
the issue of facilitating2 4 international trade.2 5 This trend is in line with the rapid
206. The WTO found in favor of the United States after it invoked dispute settlement procedures against
Japan's varietal testing requirements. WTO Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products,
WT/DS 76/R, (Oct. 27, 1998) (complaint by the United States).(file-Lexus).
207. For an example of Japan's safety standards for food addictives which may give rise to national
treatment problems or disguised trade restrictions, see USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 73, at 213.
208. See id. at 213.
209. Id.
210. TBT Agreement, art. 5.2.3.
211. See TBT Agreement art. 2.2) ("... In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are,
inter alia: available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end- uses of
products.").
212. For the details in the food products, see USTR, NTE (JAPAN), supra note 73, at 211-214.
213. See TBT Agreement, art. 2.2.
214. See Zviad V. Guruli, What Is the Best Forum for Promoting Trade Facilitation, 21 PENN ST. INT'L
L. REV. 158 (2002) ( "In general, trade facilitation is defined as:
Simplification and harmonization of international trade procedures with trade procedures
being the activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, presenting,
communicating and processing data required for the movement of goods in international
trade. This definition relates to a wide range of activities such as import and export
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promotion of computerization in international transactions, and the conclusion
and modification of the TOKYO Convention '16 for the fast track system in
customs clearance procedures, as well as the WTO Agreement on Import
Licenses. In consideration of these trends, the two countries' governments should
try to establish more reasonable and effective systems of customs procedures to
reduce customs processing periods and fall in line with international standards.
Certain kinds of sanitary and phytosanitary measures taken in the two
countries seem to be too burdensome, unnecessary and trade-distorting.
However, there may be some scientific evidence for some measures when one
considers the fact that many kinds of vermin from western countries have been
spread all over the agricultural districts in Japan and Korea since the 1970s.
These vermin are known to be resistant to agricultural chemicals and more
detrimental to products as compared with local ones. Securing such measures
with sufficient evidence will also be in line with the spirit of the WTO to protect
211the global environment.
In the case of Japan, government and NGOs have traditionally paid close
attention to preserve the natural environment with strict laws and regulations
'
1
applied internally as well as externally. Even though Japanese sanitary and
phytosanitary measures might seem to be burdensome to imports and trade-
distorting from the viewpoint of trade partner countries, they might not be so
burdensome when compared with other regulations applied to domestic
businesses. Both Japan and Korea should try to improve their sanitary and
phytosanitary system not only to be more convenient to foreign exporters, but
also to be more scientific and reasonable with sufficient and clear scientific
evidence.2'9 The two countries should also concentrate on the long-standing
investment into research and development toward their policy goal to preserve
the environment and promote international trade in these sectors.
procedures (e.g., customs or licensing procedures); transport formalities; payments,
insurance, and other financial requirements.").
Id.
215. For a comprehensive overview of the work done by various international organizations in the area
of trade facilitation, see Brian Rankin Staples, Trade Facilitation, available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/
wbiep/trade/papers_2000/Bpfacil.PDF (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
216. See supra note 204.
217. See Preamble of Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization available at http://www.
wto.org/english/res-e/analytic-index-e/wto-agree_01_e.htm (".. . while allowing for the optimal use of the
world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment, .... ").
218. See Robert G. Kondrat, Punishing and Preserving Pollution in Japan: Is American-style Criminal
Enforcement the Solution?, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J., 379, 380-81 (2000) ("In 1970, since a special session of
the Japanese Diet initiated a new era of environmental protection in Japan, the Diet passed and amended
fourteen laws that were designed to reduce and prevent pollution, giving Japan the strictest anti-pollution laws
in the world. Among these was the first law to criminalize acts of pollution that endanger human health.").
219. According to the SPS Agreement, members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary
measures which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by
measures based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendation. SPS Agreement, art. 3.
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Korea and Japan's technical regulations and standards deviate from international
norms or are unique to the two countries for no apparent science-based reason. Such
procedures may have a disproportionate impact on imports into their domestic
markets.
Many of Korea's technical barriers to trade consist of improper certification
requirements; extremely vague provisions to protect submitted data; onerous
local testing requirements; lack of transparency in the certification process;
standards and certification procedures impeding market access; and improper and
burdensome labeling requirements. Japan, meanwhile, is required to rectify or
improve its labeling requirements, safety standards and regulations. Moreover,
Japan must improve its data requirements, and regulatory decisions not based on
scientific grounds. Both Japan and Korea have been similarly criticized for their
standards, testing, labeling and certification systems and should work towards
improving their systems so that they are in line with internationally accepted
regulations.
Both countries have expressed concerns about the potential side effects of
processed products, especially food products enhanced through biotechnology,
without any concrete evidence as to their safety. These concerns reflect the
general and traditional social atmosphere biased against technology and
processed food products, particularly among the prewar generation. Considering
this, both governments should try to establish more reasonable and science-based
systems to satisfy consumer concerns and international requirements.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The anti-competitive practices of Japan and Korea can be grouped into three
categories based on their underlying motivation: anti-competitive practices
resulting from the underdevelopment of their legal systems; anti-competitive
practices designed to protect domestic industries; and anti-competitive practices
originating from and reflecting the cultural-social factors unique to the two
countries.
The two countries' governments should try to positively and strictly
implement competition policies and regulations to avoid the anti-competitive
practices originating from the underdevelopment of their legal systems and
protectionist policies. To avoid cultural and social anti-competitive practices, the
governments should establish concrete scientific evidence to support those
practices. Such evidence would demonstrate that such practices are reasonable
and fair to international trade, are necessary to sustain the specific public policy
objectives, and are the inevitable reflection of the particular situation unique to
their countries.
Coinciding with such internal efforts, both countries should externally
establish clear interpretive rules for the international regulations under the WTO
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Agreements. Any construction of the rules must consider fully the individual
countries' specific cultural, social, political, and historical backgrounds. 220 The
establishment of such construction rules might seem to contradict recent trends in
international trade-related regulations that move from soft law to hard law.
22'
However, for the practical and efficient formation of international trade and
competition regulations,222 their uniform enforceability should properly be mixed
with flexibility.223
Many of Japan and Korea's competition or international trade-related laws
have been enacted and modified passively due to the expressed or implied
pressure from countries like the United States, and the requirements of
international organizations like the WTO and OECD. These enactments or
modifications were not voluntary responses to internal public and private sector
concerns. This may have occurred in this manner because for the last forty years
both countries' rapid economic growth and development were influenced by
strong export-driven policies and dependence on foreign trade. However, under
the WTO mechanism, both countries' competition and foreign trade regulations
should be improved voluntarily and continuously to realize the blueprints for a
liberalized global market system.
220. The WTO has so far avoided looking beyond economic factors to address the lack of specificity
regarding cultural products within international trade:
Its panels have largely to acknowledge that culture may have a dual nature.... The panels
have also ignored the fact that cultural products may also have a conflicting nature .... This
refusal to create specific rules for culture and cultural products could reveal the WTO's
reluctance to believe that governments that employ protectionist measures are trying to
preserve and foster the unique entity of culture....
Karsie A. Kish, Protectionism to Promote Culture: South Korea and Japan, A Case Study, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 153, 161-62 (2001).
221. Hard law refers to a system of norms as to which a relatively high expectation of compliance exists.
Frederick M. Abbot, supra note 1, at 196.
The principal evidence of this trend may be found in two areas. The first is in the progressive
refinement of rules from the general to the specific. The second is in the transaction of the
dispute settlement system from consensus-based to quasi-judicial. These two manifestations
have occurred to some extent independently of one another. The phenomenon of rule
refinement has been underway since the founding of the GATT, and was a major theme of the
Tokyo Round negotiations which culminated in 1979.
Id. However, rule refinement does not always result in a significant reduction of the level of discretion allowed
to national governments, as evidenced to some extent by the SPS Agreement. Id. at n.44.
222. For example, the drafters of the GATT must have intended that Article XX (General Exceptions) be
used to balance free trade policies with countries' overriding public policies. However, the more recent panel
decisions are indicated to have narrowed the Article XX exceptions to the point where they are almost
completely ineffective. A broader interpretation of the Article XX exceptions is necessary to give effect to its
intended purpose. T. Alana Deere, Balancing Free Trade and the Environment: A Proposed Interpretation of
GATTArticle XX's Preamble. 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 1, 37 (1998).
223. For example, in the case of the TBT Agreement, taking into account the existence of legitimate
divergences of geographical and other factors between countries, the Agreement extends to the Members the
regulatory flexibility to reflect the differences between them. Herewith, the degree of flexibility shall be limited
by the requirement that technical regulations "should not become unnecessary obstacles to trade." See TBT
Agreement, art. 2.2, 2.4. The provisions extending flexibility to the application of the TBT Agreement could be
expanded and applied more generally to the construction of the WTO Agreements concerned.
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The historical, political, cultural 24 and social environments within the individual
countries225 substantially affect competition policies or anti-competitive practices.
This phenomenon makes it difficult to evaluate competition policy under uniform
standards of international norms. In consideration of this point, this study is limited
by the fact that the anti-competitive practices of both countries are comparatively
reviewed from the viewpoint of established international trade norms or competition
norms discussed but not yet established, without consideration of other external
factors. An interdisciplinary analysis of the anti-competitive business practices of the
two countries leading to the discovery of policy directions towards solving the trade
and competition-related problems will follow this study. Such analysis could help
foster the formation of free trade between the two countries.
224. Tony A. Freyer has pointed out Japan's cultural distinctiveness, for example, in relation with
competition policy, as follows, citing the analysis made by Naohiro Amaya [Harmony and the Antimonopoly
Law, 3 JAPAN ECHo 85, 91 (1981)]:
... [A]mericans... argued that the distinctiveness of Japanese society constituted an
illiberal, illegitimate barrier to their exports.... the critics maintained that Japan's
ideological or cultural distinctiveness encouraged collusive and anticompetitive practices...
proponents of such views agreed ... that the Japanese version of competition takes the form
of solidarity within the company ... and burning enthusiasm for combat in intercompany
relationships. For the Japanese, it was 'hard to accept' that competition 'produces losers.'
Freyer, supra note 66, at 168-69.
225. For example, there are good faith differences between countries concerning the desirable level of
government intervention in the domestic and international market place. These good faith differences lead to
disputes concerning governments' actions: whether to protect against foreign competition, or to promote
desirable national domestic policy goals. In addition, some differences between countries involve the behaviors
of consumers, enterprises and political parties, which are deeply entrenched. Abbott, supra note 1, at 186.
